Outbreak of the Second Punic War
After Carthage had been defeated by the Romans in the First Punic War, but had subsequently expanded its power again, a renewed conflict with Rome was inevitable. The Greek historian Polybios, who reflects the Roman view, saw the expansion of Punic rule in Hispania as the establishment of a power base for a war of revenge against the Romans:
"For as soon as Hamilcar, with whose personal resentment his and all the Carthaginians' indignation at this rape was united, had fought down the rebellious mercenaries and secured peace and tranquillity for his native city, his initiative was immediately directed to Iberia, in order to gain there the means of war against the Romans. And this now is to be regarded as the third cause [of the later war], I mean the successes of Carthaginian policy in Iberia. For, confident of the power they had gained there, they proceeded confidently to war."
That Carthage actually wanted war at this time, however, is unlikely. The Ebro Treaty between Hasdrubal and Rome in 226 BC, which established the Ebro as the border between Rome and Carthage, disproves Polybios' view: it was not Carthage but Rome that was looking for a pretext to declare war. When the barquid Hannibal captured the city of Sagunt south of the Ebro in 219, with which the Romans had shortly before allied themselves in violation of the agreement, the Roman Senate changed its behavior and threatened Carthage with war if the latter did not immediately hand over Hannibal. The Romans wanted to act before Carthage became more powerful again, and since they had just subdued the Gauls in the Po Valley, the timing seemed opportune. So in 219 BC they made an unacceptable offer in the Carthaginian council: 'Then the Roman [Quintus Fabius], gathering his toga into a hollow, said: 'Here we bring you war and peace; take what you will!' To these words they no less defiantly replied with clamour that he might give them what he wanted. And when, on the other hand, pouring out the hollow, he declared that he was giving them war, they all answered that they accepted it, and would wage it with the very courage with which they accepted it."
Hannibal's train through the Alps
→ Main article: Hannibal's crossing of the Alps
At the outbreak of the war, Hannibal had about 90,000 foot soldiers and 12,000 horsemen at his disposal. He decided to pre-empt the Romans, who were preparing an invasion of Africa, by going on the offensive himself. Since the Roman fleet had controlled the sea since 241, Hannibal had only the land route available to attack Rome in Italy. To defend the conquered territories in Hispania, he left 10,000 infantry under Hanno in Hispania and sent another 10,000 to the threatened African homeland. Furthermore, he carried 37 war elephants with him.
Historians are still not in agreement about the route he took, but it is assumed that he first went upstream the Rhodanus (Rhône) and later the Isara (Isère). According to Polybios, he probably crossed the Alps via the Col de Clapier and descended into what is now Italy at the onset of winter. Almost six months after he left Carthago Nova, some 38,000 foot soldiers, 8,000 horsemen, all 37 elephants, plus 12,000 Libyans and 8,000 Spanish foot soldiers reached the Po Valley in November. The reasons for the land route were, on the one hand, the dangers of a sea voyage, especially as the Roman fleet was far superior to Carthage's fleet after the First Punic War, as already mentioned, and, on the other hand, the element of surprise. Moreover, Hannibal tried with success to win over several Gallic tribes. But also on the land way about 9,000 Punic perished.
Roman tactics and the Battle of Ticinus
→Main article Battle of Ticinus
| Approximate location of the battlefield |
Roman tactics envisaged a double attack on Carthage-occupied Hispania as well as on the Carthaginian heartland on the North African coast. The attack on Hispania was led by Publius Cornelius Scipio (consul 218 BC), who was already on his way to Spain with the fleet when he learned in Massilia of Hannibal's crossing of the Rhône. But despite his scouts, Scipio did not succeed in confronting Hannibal before the Alps, whereupon he returned to Italy to confront the Carthaginian in the Po Valley. The attack on North Africa was led by Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who, upon receiving Scipio's message, broke off his preparations in Sicily and turned to the theater of war in northern Italy.
Of the two consuls, Scipio was the first to reach the Po, marching towards Hannibal with a force of about 2,500 foot soldiers and 1,500 mounted men, and setting up camp near the river Ticinus. A chance meeting of scouting parties thus developed into the first battle in November 218 BC. When the Punic units attacked, the Roman spearmen fled and the Carthaginian cavalry surrounded the remaining legionaries, who were completely routed. Scipio was severely wounded in the engagement and was reportedly only saved by a heroic intervention by his son.
After the defeat, Scipio wanted to avoid Hannibal as much as possible and wait for further reinforcements from Rome. But Sempronius, who had rushed from Sicily to help, demanded a military decision before the end of December 218 BC.
