Synonym

Synonyms or synonyma (from ancient Greek συνώνυμος synṓnymos, German 'of the same name' resp. the related noun συνωνυμία synōnymía, German 'sameness of name'; both composed of the prefix συν- syn-, German 'together' as well as ὄνομα ónoma, German 'name') are linguistic or lexical expressions and signs that have the same or a very similar scope of meaning. The relation between synonyms is called synonymy or homosemy and is an important semantic relation to be distinguished from other sense relations. In particular, different words can be synonymous with each other: they have the same meaning in all contexts of use. The term synonym (for instance in dictionaries of synonyms) is often also used in a weaker sense to refer to words of very similar meaning.

A word is always synonymous only in relation to another word. But because words are often ambiguous, synonymy exists more precisely between a particular reading of a word and other readings. Words with opposite meanings are antonyms.

Term of synonymy

The prerequisite for the concept of synonymy is the distinction between word and concept or, more generally, between the sign and the meaning of the sign. In the following, we will mainly speak of linguistic designations or denominations and thus of word and concept. A word may stand for several terms - as a homonym -, and likewise there may be several words for one term - as synonyms. Words are synonyms to each other if they stand for the same concept.

In the case of a term (in the broader sense), a distinction can be made between its content (its intension or the idea associated with the term) and its scope (its extension or the object or thing grasped by the term). With this distinction, the term "meaning" is ambiguous, denoting both the intension of a term and the extension, or both.

Synonymy in the sense of equality of meaning or similarity of meaning can therefore refer to intensional or extensional meaning. Since extensional equality follows from intensional equality, but not intensional equality from extensional equality, there are two possible combinations here: (a) intensional and extensional meaning equality (or similarity), and (b) intensional dissimilarity and extensional meaning equality (or similarity).

The case of intensional and extensional identity is rare. One could think of: "twelve" = "12" = "XII" = "twelve". In all cases the mentioned expressions mean in an identical way the notion of the number [twelve] in intensional and thus in extensional respect.

As a case of intensional difference and extensional equality, the example of Gottlob Frege "Abendstern" - "Morgenstern" can be cited. Both words designate Venus, but each via a different conceptual content.

The criterion of synonymy is widely considered to be an extensional equality. Synonymy can then be defined as extensional congruence or as partial or complete "reference equality" of different signs. The truth value of a propositional sentence does not change predicate-logically if a predicate changes but not the extension denoted by the predicate. Thus, the criterion for synonymy is interchangeability without the truth-value of a proposition changing, in other words salva veritate. In a similar sense, "interchangeability in contexts without causing a difference in meaning" is required as a criterion.

The Salva-veritate criterion is criticized by Willard Van Orman Quine as insufficient, since it leads to great difficulties in modal contexts. But also Frege was already aware of these problems of opaque contexts.

In contrast to the assumption that synonymy already exists when the same thing is designated extensively, this case of reference identity is sometimes distinguished from synonymy and is understood to be an intensional identity or similarity.

For the synonymy relation, connotative differences, i.e. secondary meanings and nuances and accompanying ideas caused by them, are generally disregarded. In the above numerical example, there is probably also an equal meaning in connotative terms. However, only in the ratio "twelve" to "12", since already the use of the Roman numerals "XII" can be connoted with higher education.

In principle, it could be argued that for words which are supposed to be sufficiently exact linguistic images of concepts, there can already objectively be no synonyms in the sense of an equality of meaning, since then the words would also have to be the same. Accordingly, a word which is not similar in form to another must have a different meaning simply because it is not the same word. In legal form, this principle is called the prohibition of synonyms: the same thing may not be designated by different words, the same thing must always be designated by the same word.

Strict and partial synonymy

A distinction is made between strict and partial synonymy (similarity of meaning).

Strict synonymy (equality of meaning)

Strict synonymy (equality of meaning, synonymy in the strict, narrow sense) requires not only that two lexical signs have the same denotative meaning, but also that they are interchangeable in all contexts and have the same effect in all contexts.

Examples of strict synonym pairs in German are, according to common usage: orange - orange; match - match.

However, it must already be objected here that this kind of synonymy in the pair orange - Apfelsine only applies to the northern half of the German-speaking area. In German-speaking Switzerland, for example, and in Austria, Apfelsine is clearly marked as a Teutonism. This word as part of a text would clearly situate it as acting in northern Germany. In texts set in Switzerland or Austria, the word would sound strange, and even in Bavaria, the usage would mark a "Zugereist" or holidaymaker. This example can therefore only be interpreted as a similarity of meaning.

Even in the case of reference equality, "differences in meaning" can thus occur: "valuation by the speaker (horse - Klepper), sociolect (money - peep), dialect (girl - Dirn), stylistic levels of language (Zimmer - Gemach), political language use (attack - pre-emptive strike), technical language (blood vein - vein), euphemism (die - go home), foreign word use (Innenstadt - city)."

The fact that overall only a few uncontroversial examples of strict synonymy are found is understandable from the point of view of linguistic economy. The tendency to avoid redundancies in the structuring of the lexicon does not allow for a larger amount of strict synonymy in the vocabulary of natural languages. Nevertheless, the concept of strict synonymy can be useful from a methodological point of view in order to mark an ideal reference point on an imaginary scale of synonymy of meaning.

Partial synonymy (similarity of meaning)

General

An example of a non-strict synonym pair is jumbled - confused. For this purpose, two example sentences:

1. "He seems a bit confused today." = "He seems a little confused today."

2. "His speech today was a little confused." ≠ "His speech today was a little confused."

Partial synonyms are also called homoionyms. The following aspects of connotative meaning have the effect that two lexical signs with the same denotative meaning do not meet the strict requirements of strict synonymy:

• regional differentiation: butcher - butcher; roll - roll - roll - roll - roll
• native word versus foreign word: elevator/elevator - lift

• Latin origin versus Germanic origin: vertical - perpendicular (see also German language history)

In most everyday usage situations, the less strict criterion of substitutability salva veritate in typical contexts is sufficient to identify a pair of lexical signs as synonyms:

3. (a) "He's not using the genitive again." ⇐⇒ (b) "He's not using the wesfall again. “

From the facts described in sentence 3a necessarily follows the facts described in sentence 3b and vice versa.

Briefly summarized: There is a similar or almost the same meaning in words as well as kinship to equivalence.

Hyponymy as a special case of partial synonymy

Expressions for subordinate terms of a common superordinate term (cohyponyms) form a special case of partial synonymy. However, the terminology is inconsistent: others do not want to include superordinate and subordinate relations in the concept of synonymy - not even in partial synonymy.

For Aristotle, at the beginning of his Categories, this is "the" form of synonymy. There it is said:

"Synonymous is called that which has the name in common and in which the expression belonging to the name is the same as far as the essence is concerned, for example, man and cattle are living beings. Indeed, each of them is called by a common name as a living being, and the expression is the same as far as the essence is concerned."

In Aristotle's example, the expressions "man" and "cattle" denote, among other things, the same semantic feature [living being], which is at the same time a generic term for both man and cattle.