Scientific law

The title of this article is ambiguous. For other meanings, see Natural law (disambiguation).

In the philosophy of science, a law of nature refers to a regularity of processes in nature. Furthermore, the plural form "laws of nature" denotes the totality of these regularities, including those that have not yet been discovered or formulated, regardless of their specific formulation. Natural laws differ from other laws in that they cannot be enacted or overridden by humans at their discretion. A precise, uniform conclusive definition of the term does not currently exist.

The demarcation from the laws of the individual sciences (in particular from the laws of physics as the basis of the natural sciences) as well as the true nature of the laws of nature (abstraction or ontological fact) and, moreover, the question whether axioms of scientific models and chemical, physical or cosmological constants also belong to them, are the subject of ongoing debates.

Through the development of modern physics and the reductionism and naturalism associated with it, a paradigmatic understanding of natural laws as a necessary regularity in sequences of observable events has emerged, which determine all events of their respective types without exception. This excluded some scientific rules from the body of natural laws. Formally, scientific as well as natural laws are expected to allow explaining and predicting observable events. However, this criterion is not sufficient for delimitation: The question of causality, especially in the case of confirmed statistical laws, and their verifiability is another problem. In the debate about scientific laws, one camp (following David Hume) emphasizes regularity, which allows an understanding of statistical laws as expressions of natural laws, or the need for an underlying cause-effect relationship.

Between the scientific laws of the individual sciences (even of physics), which are currently regarded as valid, on the one hand, and laws of nature in the general sense, there is a difference, at least according to the claim. Pragmatism or falsificationism, for example, assumes that the scientific laws are only an approximation of the laws of nature, which are the expression of a necessity that determines the course of nature. Logical positivism, on the other hand, regards the laws of nature merely as rules derived from observed natural events that are repeatedly confirmed by experience; it assumes that no meaningful statement can be made beyond experience (the sense criterion of empiricism).

Representation and types

In a narrower science-theoretical paraphrase, a law of nature in the real sciences represents a description of regularities in the behavior of objects that is abstracted from the behavior of individual objects and that applies independently of any human evaluation.

Laws of nature are often part of a scientific theory and can be expressed with mathematical formulas. These abstractions describe possible worlds; which of them correspond to the real world is an empirical question.

Laws of nature apply independently of human observation. They cannot be made by humans, but only discovered by them. The laws of nature are explored, on the one hand, to understand the world, and on the other hand, to apply and use the knowledge gained. Not the mere perception of nature with our senses, but only the "laws of nature create reality". "Direct experience reveals only a fraction of natural phenomena."

The laws of nature are structured into domains and build on each other hierarchically. Together with the development of their objects and systems, the associated laws also develop. Individual laws are combined into theories as far as possible. The interpretation of the laws and theories of the experiential scientific domains as laws of nature is called ontological naturalism. However, whether all scientific laws can be traced back to physical laws about elementary particles and forces is questionable. This problem, which affects both subfields of physics and the relationship to the other natural sciences, is treated under the catchword "emergence". In some empirical sciences outside physics, it has therefore become customary - also because of the limited scope - to dispense with the term "law" and to speak instead of "rules".

There are different types of laws of nature: Deterministic cause-effect relationships that can be represented as mathematical functions and numbers (examples: laws of mechanics and electrodynamics), statements about static averages (examples: thermodynamics, theory of ideal gases), statements about collective probabilities (quantum theory), or deterministic-chaotic behavior in emergent self-organized processes. Laws of nature are always and everywhere valid, but their formulation can only be correct under restrictions. Therefore, it must be further developed as soon as new assured knowledge is gained or its scope is to be extended. To investigate and verify the laws of nature and the laws of other empirical sciences, the experiential method of work is used, which consists of the phases of observations, recognition of regularities, hypothesis, measurements, predictions, verification, development of a theory, and so on. Even the predictions of a hypothesis that have not yet been observed must be verified as far as possible.

Examples (selection)

  • Physics: Newton's law of gravity, conservation laws...
  • Chemistry: periodic table, structure principle, Grimm's hydride displacement theorem...
  • Biology: Biogenetic basic rule

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