Red Army

The Red Workers' and Peasants' Army (Russian Рабоче-крестьянская Красная армия (РККА)/ Raboche-krestyanskaya Krasnaya armiya (RKKA), short Russian Красная армия (КА): Red Army (RA)) was the designation for the army and air forces of Soviet Russia, or Soviet Union from 1922 onwards. It originated in the immediate aftermath of the October Revolution, when the Bolsheviks constituted an army to oppose the military formations of their opponents (especially the groups grouped under the generic term White Army) in the Russian Civil War. Since February 1946, the Red Army, which together with the Soviet Navy constituted the main component of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, bore the official name Soviet Army (Russian Советская армия (СА)/Sovietskaya armiya).

Although the Red Army - or, from 1946, the Soviet Army - comprised exclusively the Land Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces (from 1948), and Strategic Missile Forces (from 1960), both terms often stood for the entire Soviet armed forces in the general perception.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia took over most of the remaining personnel and equipment of the Soviet Army and the rest of the Soviet armed forces to form the Russian Armed Forces.

Foundation and structure

The Red Army was founded by a decision of the Council of People's Commissars on 15 Jan^. Jul. / 28 Jan. 1918greg^. on the basis of the Red Guard. The implementation was carried out with the decisive participation of the People's Commissar for Military Affairs, Leon Trotsky, who used the help of military specialists from the former tsarist army for this purpose.

At its foundation, the Red Army was a volunteer army without ranks, without rank insignia or special emphasis on individual functionaries. This was to emphasize the ideal of equality of all people. Commanders were elected democratically, and the orders of the officers could be discussed and rejected by the subordinates. This was due, first, to the organization of the Red Guards, of which the Red Army was partly composed, and, second, to the Bolshevik peace propaganda before the October Revolution, which called on the soldiers of the tsarist army to resist their officers.

In order to increase military efficiency, this system was abolished by War Commissar Trotsky with the support of the Politburo shortly after the formation of the Red Army. Commanders were now again appointed from above rather than elected. There was thereafter the designation of service positions, from which ranks developed (see Ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces 1918-1935). On 29 May 1918, in the midst of the Civil War, universal conscription was introduced for men between the ages of 18 and 40 to take up the fight against the White Guards/armies of the anti-Bolshevik movements.

The Red Army introduced new uniforms, including the Budyonovka as headgear. The battle song during the Civil War became White Army, Black Baron.

Due to the lack of officers, especially in higher command functions, generals and officers of the Tsarist army were initially recruited on a voluntary basis. Some generals, such as Alexei Brussilov, Mikhail Bonch-Bruyevich, Dmitri Parsky, Vladislav Klembovsky, Alexei Gutor, and the first commander-in-chief of the newly formed Red Army, General Jukums Vācietis, had commanded fronts and armies under the tsar or had served in high staff positions. The General Staff was initially composed almost exclusively of such officers, later joined by newly trained officers such as the later Commander-in-Chief Sergei Kamenev.

A political commissar (politruk, политический руководитель) was assigned to each Red Army unit up to battalion level. He possessed the authority to cancel orders of commanders who violated the principles of the CPSU. This reduced military efficiency, but ensured the political reliability of the army to the party.

With the introduction of conscription, more generals and officers were called up, including those who had already served briefly in the White Army. By the end of the Civil War, some 75,000 former Tsarist generals and officers were serving in the Red Army, of whom some 15,000 were from the White Army. Tsarist officers who still served in the Soviet Army in World War II and after include Boris Shaposhnikov, Alexander Vasilevsky, and Leonid Govorov.

Under the leadership of the People's Commissar for Army and Fleet, Mikhail V. Frunze - who shortly before his death became the commander-in-chief of the army as "Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council" - a military reform took place. The Red Army was organized as a mixed cadre/militia army. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, territorial units were also formed from local populations. In 1925, the first conscription law valid for the entire Soviet Union was enacted. Conscription took place at the age of 21 with service of two to four years in the standing army or less than one year in the militia units. Only "workers and peasants" were called up for military service; persons of other social origins, such as large farmers, Cossacks or burghers, served in rear units and work troops or had to pay a military tax.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo, there was German-Soviet cooperation in the military field between the world wars. This concerned above all the air force, armoured forces and chemical weapons, the possession of which was forbidden to the German Reich. For this purpose, the Secret Aviation School and Testing Site of the Reichswehr was founded in Lipetsk in 1925.

In the mass organization OSSOAWIACHIM, founded in 1927, the Soviet youth received paramilitary training.

Reform and rearmament of the Red Army in the 1930s

Professional officers, originally abolished as a legacy of tsarism, were reintroduced in 1935. The general staff was mostly made up of officers with experience from the Civil War.

The peacetime strength of the Soviet armed forces was about 700,000 men in the late 1920s and grew to more than a million by 1933.

During this period, V. K. Triandafillov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, Y. P. Uborevich, I. E. Yakir, A. I. Zedyakin, G. S. Isserson, Y. I. Alksnis, among others, developed modern military theories, the decisive role being given to the concept of deep operation for future wars of general motorization and mechanization of the army, with emphasis on the tank weapon. The development of the armaments industry, with an emphasis on tank production, was therefore given a central position in the first and second five-year plans of Soviet industry. By 1936, between 10,000 and 15,000 mainly light and medium tanks had been built. By the time of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, this number had been increased to 24,000. The Red Army thus possessed the most powerful tank weapon in the world in terms of numbers and weight. For comparison, Germany possessed about 2500 mainly light and medium tanks in 1939, France about 4000 tanks of all weights.

The tank force was initially divided into mechanized corps (tanks with motorized infantry and artillery) and armored infantry support corps. The former were to be used for deep penetrations into enemy lines and subsequent encirclement and rolling up of the enemy. The mechanized corps thus resembled the German armored divisions in function and partial equipment.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union was a leader in the development of airborne troops. In 1934/1935 the first Soviet radar systems RUS-1 and RUS-2 were tested, which were used for the first time in the Winter War against Finland.

The Red Army made great use of tank platoons. In 1918 it had 23 tank platoons, by the end of 1919 59, and in 1921 there were 103. They were subordinated to the armored troops. The main types used in World War II were the BP-35, OB-3, NKPS-42 and BP-43. 78 OB-3 and NKPS-42 were built by November 1942. Of the light tank platoon BP-43 21 pieces.

Interpreting the Soviet experience in the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet army was again restructured: The Soviet military experienced that tank attacks without direct infantry and artillery support could be easily repulsed due to the relatively good equipment of the Franquists with anti-tank guns. The Germans, based on similar considerations, drew the conclusion early on to mechanize the supporting infantry and artillery and deploy them in the close range of the attack; the Soviet Union, on the other hand, disbanded the mechanized corps and incorporated its tanks and motorized troops into the existing infantry divisions. This measure cost the Red Army much of its previously existing mobility, as the advancing tanks were now forced to match their speed with the slow infantry.

However, another lesson from the Spanish Civil War was to have an extremely positive effect on the Red Army. Since the existing T-26, BT-5 and BT-7 tanks proved to be too lightly armored for assault, the development of heavier, better armored models was initiated. The result of this development was the T-34, KW-1 and KW-2 main battle tanks, which were to prove extremely useful in the later stages of the war and far superior to the early German models. Mass production of these models was initiated as quickly as possible and from 1939 the first of these tanks were delivered to the troops. However, the number of tanks delivered remained small compared to the existing light tanks until 1941.

The USSR Constitution of 1936, known as the Stalin Constitution, declared conscription to be a "sacred duty" of all Soviet citizens in the context of continued massive rearmament. As a result, the conscription law of 1939 was passed. It established the transition to a fully cadre-based army and lowered the age of conscription to 19.

In the course of the 1930s, propaganda no longer aimed primarily at the political dimension of the class struggle, but turned more to the patriotic feelings of the population with "Soviet patriotism" and referred positively to pre-revolutionary Russian history. Thus, war against the German invaders was called the "Great Patriotic War," a reference to the "Patriotic War" against Napoleon Bonaparte in 1812. Traditional Russian heroes such as Alexander Nevsky and Mikhail Kutuzov became an important part of the propaganda. During the war, repressions against the Russian Orthodox Church ceased; the traditional practice of blessing weapons in church before battle was reinstated. The single military command (Russian "единоначалие") was introduced in 1943. Political commissars became deputies for political work of the respective commanders. Badges of rank, orders and medals of pre-revolutionary pattern were reintroduced. In that period many "revolutionary achievements" within the armed forces were abolished. For example, a strict duty of salute and strict formal discipline were only now enforced; the gap between leaders and enlisted men deepened. A feature of this was also the issue of representative uniforms for senior officers and the reintroduction of generalship ranks. The sober rank designations that had been common until then, such as "brigade commander" (Комбриг Kombrig) or "division commander" (Комдив Komdiw), disappeared.

After the experiences of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War and the Japanese-Soviet border conflict, the Soviet tank force was again restructured. The previously disbanded mechanized corps were to be reorganized and enlarged. However, this reorganization process was still in its early stages at the outbreak of the Great PatrioticWar.

On July 27, 1940, it was decided to build a fleet of 15 Soviet-Soyuz-class battleships.

Stalin's purges

During the great Stalin purges, especially in the years 1937 to 1939, a great many senior officers were deported to gulags or murdered by the NKVD. Arrested were three out of five marshals of the Soviet Union, 13 out of 15 army commanders, 57 out of 85 corps commanders, almost all commanders of divisions and brigades, about half of all regimental commanders, and 75 out of 80 members of the Supreme Military Council. This most extensive dismantling of the officer corps was to be bitterly avenged first in the Winter War against Finland and then in the Great Patriotic War.

Even after the purges, the Red Army was hardly independent, with which the CPSU primarily wanted to avert any political competition. However, it also crippled its military capacity to act. For example, officer training took place in party-run academies. Moreover, promotion was possible if the officer in question was a party member, and likewise every military order required the countersignature of a political officer. Furthermore, members of the Central Committee of Political Enlightenment (Glawpolitproswet) formed the backbone of the military hierarchy. Routinely, the missile troops had no authority over warheads, nor did the airborne troops over transportation or the armored troops over ammunition.

From the beginning of 1937 to the beginning of May 1940, 34,301 officers were removed from their posts. About 70% of them had to go to the Gulag. The shootings mainly affected the highest level of leadership, combined with a weakening in the Red Army's leadership tasks.

Soviet Commander: Mikhail Tukhachevsky


Red Army parade in Moscow 1922

Strategy

Soviet war doctrine emphasizes the "primacy of the offensive." The infantry combat regulations of 1941 state: "Offensive combat is the main form of combat of the Red Army". Also the defense was always actively led by counterattacks and served the always to be initiated later counteroffensive. A distinction was made between 4 forms of offensive maneuver:

• the front blow
• the breakthrough
• the flank attack
• the perimeter

The frontal attack was the most basic and common maneuver. The most frequently used form was the "smashing blow". A special form of the "smashing blow" was the "thrusting wedge" also called "cutting" or "splitting" blow. Here the Red Army did not seek the single, all-decisive blow, as Germany did with the Blitzkrieg strategy, but a series of shattering blows of increasing strength, in which the last was to be the most powerful. This principle was expressed in Stalin's ten blows in 1944. Soviet war doctrine placed special emphasis on the "principle of concentration and economy of forces." It sought battle-decisive superiority over the enemy. The predominant form of concentration of forces was the main blow. The determination of the main blow was regarded as the predominant problem of strategy and was considered of the utmost importance. A strength ratio of 2:1 or 3:1 was considered the minimum superiority in the prewar period. During the war, in Garthoff's estimation, a ratio of 6:1 was sought, with a minimum of 4:1. Superiority in the main direction is established mainly through the "economy of forces," through economies in secondary directions. Soviet war doctrine emphasized a high momentum of the attack, which has as its goal the total destruction of the enemy. After a breakthrough, the pursuit of the enemy had to be initiated in order to destroy him completely. A particularly frequently used phrase in this context was: "to the last end".

Principle of planning and all-round assurance

For the Soviet military leadership, chance was merely a danger arising from poor planning and foresight. Garthoff argues that chance cannot play a normal role in a theory like Marxism-Leninism, which claims to predict the course of history. While the German military viewed war as an art, the Red Army viewed war as a science. Thus, for General Lothar Rendulic, a decision is based on "intuition" and an "emotional settling in," the mystery of which "even the doer cannot give himself a complete account." Consideration as a science is expressed particularly clearly in the formulas for the necessary density of weapons, barriers, etc. Thus, the Soviet artillery has norms for the amount of shells for the destruction of enemy groupings, depending on the degree of destruction, the size of the target, and so on. Great importance was attached to these norms and they were strictly observed.