Philosophy
→ Main article: Marxist philosophy
Although Marx and Engels primarily pursued a critique of philosophy and ideology, which aimed at the emancipation of man, Marxism itself is sometimes understood as a philosophical doctrine with a humanistic character. In terms of epistemology and scientific theory, Marxism is characterized by two essential elements: Hegel's dialectics and Feuerbach's epistemological materialism. Lenin refers to materialism as the philosophy of Marxism. Marx already criticized the philosophers in 1845 in his famous sentence:
"Philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; what matters is to change it."
In contrast to philosophical idealism, Marxism holds the view that all ideas, conceptions and thoughts arise from the complex, especially social reality and the power relations that contain them, which would develop "in the last instance" from the respective historical-geographical relations of production and material conditions. Marx and Engels - influenced by the Young Hegelians - adopted Feuerbach's materialist world view and supplemented the dialectic and the associated idea of constant development from the work of Hegel.
Marx and Engels thus overcame what they saw as the one-sided view of the mechanical materialists, who saw the world as unchanging. In 1843, Karl Marx adopted Hegel's figure of thought of dialectics as well as the assumption of a regularity of history. Unlike Hegel, however, he did not attribute this to the unfolding of the "world spirit", but to material, social conditions and conflicts within society.
Lenin refers to the philosophical views of Marx and Engels as dialectical materialism, although they did not use this term themselves. Lenin refers to the materialist dialectics of Marx and Engels as
"the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, which gives us a reflection of eternally evolving matter."
In the discovery of the radium, the electron as well as the transformation of the elements, Lenin sees a confirmation of these views, which would refute the idealist postulate of eternal standstill. According to Hegelian dialectics, the image of the world in the active comprehension of its interrelationships is characterized by interrelated opposites - theses and antitheses - which mutually advance in the dialectical three-step to syntheses. These syntheses drive "objective reality" forward and thus "determine" the future until it no longer contains contradictions and is "suspended" in the concept of the "absolute". For the idealist philosopher, this progress, which permeates the material world as a whole, is a product of the human spirit, which in grasping itself becomes identical with the absolute "world spirit".
Marx looks at the Hegelian dialectic from the point of view of materialism: he turns it "upside down" and postulates that objective reality can be explained by its material existence and its development, and not as the realization of a divine absolute idea or as the product of human thought.
"My dialectical method is not only different from Hegel's in its basis, but its direct antithesis. For Hegel, the thought-process, which he even transforms into an independent subject under the name Idea, is the demiurge of the real, which only forms its outer appearance. With me, conversely, the ideal is nothing but the material transposed and translated in the human head."
The universe is seen, as in Hegel's universal-historical philosophy, as a totality, that is, as an objectively coherent whole. But Marx understands the merely mental opposites in idealism as expressions and images of real, material opposites: These, too, depended on each other and were in a constant movement of reciprocal influence. This movement is altogether ascending, i.e., it moves as a whole from the simple to the complex and in the process passes through certain levels, to which certain qualitative changes correspond, so that they drive development forward.
According to this view, an objective reality also exists outside and independent of human consciousness in the material movements, on which, however, people (themselves a part of the material) consciously act back. This does not at all mean, however, that people grasp their environment objectively correctly; Marx and Engels want precisely to escape the ideological self-deception, the false consciousness of the environment, hence the problem of the subject-object split:
· The correct understanding of the laws of motion of phenomena and events can only ever proceed from the analysis of practice and never from an idealistic "quirk", since the latter cannot derive a phenomenon from its material origins.
Freedom does not lie in the dreamed independence from the laws of nature, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility thus given of letting them work according to plan for certain purposes.
· This already addresses the relationship between the abstract and the concrete (drawing abstract conclusions from practice, developing concrete practice again from the abstract conclusions):
He was a man, and I was a man, and I was a man, and I was a man, and I was a man, and I was a man, and I was a man. I was a very good friend of his," he said, "and I was a very good friend of his, and I was a very good friend of his, and I was a very good friend of his, and I was a very good friend of his, and I was a very good friend of his. He was a man, and he was a man, and he was a man, and he was a man, and he was a man, and he was a man, and he was a man, and he was a man, and he was a man, and he was a man.
· The touchstone for the correctness of assumptions or theories (= relative truth) is then again one's own practice, in which the theory proves to be right or wrong.
The question whether human thinking has objective truth - is not a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice, man must prove the truth ... of his thinking.
This review is necessary, he argues, because the consciousness of man is always determined by his interactions with the environment, that is, by being.
This assumption experiences its strongest effect when one reflects on future social developments; in this sense, any utopianism is rejected. According to a materialist world view, "the production and reproduction of real life" must become the "determining moment in history", labour must therefore be a central category for the individual himself and for social development. Therefore, all social orders are decisively determined by economic laws of motion:
"In the social production of their lives men enter into certain necessary relations independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a certain stage of development of their material productive forces. The totality of these relations of production forms the economic structure of society, the real basis on which a juridical and political superstructure rises and to which certain social forms of consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and spiritual process of life in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but conversely their social being that determines their consciousness."
The consequence of this view is a comprehensive critique of religion, law and morality. Marx understands these as products of the material relations in question, to which they are also subject to change. Religion, law and morality would therefore not have the universal validity they claim.
Historical materialism
→ Main article: Historical materialism
Historical materialism is the application of the guiding principles of dialectical materialism to the study of society and its history. According to it, the development of a society can also be explained scientifically: Due to the class struggle, the social relations between the classes are in an uninterrupted movement. The productive forces (labour and means of production) develop over time until they come into conflict with the relations of production (division of labour and distribution of property). Marx sees the relations of production as "fetters" which form an obstacle to the further development of the productive forces. The underclasses are always intent on changing the relations of production to their advantage. As a result, new ruling classes come into being and the class struggle begins again.
Marx distinguishes between the following historical stages of development of society:
· tribal or primitive society, also primitive communism
· Slaveholding society
· Feudal society
· Capitalist society
After the overcoming of capitalism inevitably follow:
· Socialism
· Communism
The history of a society is a (natural) development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher. That is why communism is inevitable in the future. In Marx's view, capitalism leads to ever greater crises. Socialist society will therefore replace capitalist society, just as capitalist society replaced the feudal order. The class struggle ends only in the communist order, in which the opposition of master and servant is abolished.
Political economy (analysis of capitalism)
Having developed an epistemological position with dialectical materialism, and a general theory of history and society with historical materialism, Marx had come significantly closer to his analysis of contemporary concrete society. The next necessary step for him was now to study the economic laws of motion in capitalist societies, since, according to the theory of historical materialism, the mode of production of a society is significant for its development. The heart of his work is the Critique of Political Economy in the three volumes of Capital. The laws of exploitation in ruling capitalism, the emergence of modern class society, and the process of concentration of capital are analyzed in both micro- and macroeconomically differentiated ways. In doing so, Marx drew on preliminary work in national economics, e.g. by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Value theory, impoverishment theory and crisis theory are important components of this analysis.