French invasion of Russia

Napoleon's Russian campaign of 1812 (called the Campagne de Russie in French, or the Patriotic War - Отечественная война, Otečestvennaja vojna - in Russian) represents the first phase of the Sixth Coalition War, in which France and Russia faced off with their respective allies. The campaign, after initial French successes, ended in one of the greatest military disasters in history. After the complete expulsion of the Grande Armée from Russian territory, the campaign led to the second phase of the war in early 1813: in the Wars of Liberation, first Prussia, then Austria, and later the French-dominated German Confederate States of the Rhine took the anti-Napoleonic side, which defeated France in 1814 and forced Napoleon to abdicate.

Logistics

In earlier wars, the French army had supplied itself almost exclusively from the land it passed through. For the most part, French Revolutionary troops, like Napoleon's later troops, did not have a militarily organized troop like other armies and were therefore faster and more mobile, but dependent on constant supplies from the peasants and merchants of the occupied country. This strategy had worked well in densely populated central Europe, but in the vastness of Russia, with its sparse population and poor road network, this method was doomed to failure. For the war against Russia, Emperor Napoleon had planned more extensive logistics than before, and in Prussia and Poland many warehouses were filled with supplies. Large numbers of barges were used on the rivers in Prussia and Poland to take supplies by water. The timing of the invasion had also been determined from a logistical point of view. Napoleon assumed that the army could supply itself with Russian grain at this time of year, and there should be sufficient fodder for horses and cattle. Medical supplies were exemplary for the time. The French army was one of the first to have ambulances. The doctor Dominique Jean Larrey, who had introduced the mobile hospitals, accompanied the army in Russia as head of the medical corps.

Due to this requirement, the entourage that followed the Grand Army was very extensive. Napoleon's personal entourage alone consisted of eighteen supply wagons, a cloakroom coach, two butlers, three cooks, six servants and eight grooms. He himself rode in a six-horse carriage, and another 52 carriages were needed for his staff alone, as well as an enormous number of carriages just to supply them. For the construction of bridges, pontoons were carried on several wagons as well as carts with materials and tools for pioneers. Field blacksmiths and a mobile printing press were part of the troop. The artillery had more than 3,000 wagons only with their mounts for the cannons and the accompanying ammunition wagons. Tailors, cobblers and other craftsmen accompanied the army. More than 50 cash wagons with money for soldiers' pay and other expenses accompanied the troops. Each staff of each corps had a huge fleet of wagons, including many wagons for the personal comfort of senior officers. Often this hampered the carriages, which were important for the supply of the army. The physician Heinrich von Roos reported that when he reached Vilna, his medical vehicles had not even crossed the Nyemen.

In addition to the fleet of vehicles already available to the units, Napoleon had 26 battalions of equipages with over 6,000 wagons provided for military transport. The army was to be followed by herds of cattle for slaughter, which, driven forward without pause, rapidly emaciated and died to a considerable extent at the roadside. In addition, some of the 26 Equipagen battalions were harnessed to oxen intended for later consumption; these animals perished after a short time because of the inadequate supply. The carts of the 26 Equipagen battalions, which together had a transport capacity of barely 8000 tons, were not remotely sufficient to feed the approximately 600,000 men of the Grande Armée (the occupying troops in Prussia and Poland, as well as the numerous military officials who followed the army, eventually also had to be fed). Therefore, just like the "revolutionary troops" before them, the French units commandeered countless horse-drawn vehicles in Prussia, Poland, and Lithuania. According to an official report by the government in Königsberg, in 1812 the French army formally requisitioned 1,629 carts and 7,546 horses in the Prussian province of East Prussia alone.

In addition, the passing troops of the Grande Armée forcibly took another 26,579 wagons and 79,161 horses from the province. Similar numbers were reported from the other Prussian provinces and the Duchy of Warsaw. The Marquis de Chambray described these countless private carriages, which accompanied the troops without order, as "a veritable plague", since they constantly blocked the roads and thus tore the marching formations apart. The horses and people forced by the army to come along had to fend for themselves, as they were not part of the army. These were ruthlessly exploited for a short time, so that many of them perished miserably in the process and never returned home. The Grand Army at the end of August spread over an area of about 350,000 square miles. From the well-filled large magazines in Danzig, the transport columns had to cover over 900 kilometers only as far as Smolensk. For this journey a transport battalion (there and back) needed more than 80 days. Therefore, in January and February 1813, many of the French magazines in Prussia, in Poland or in Lithuania were still filled with food, clothing, medicines and other necessities when they were captured by Russian and Prussian troops, while at the same time many French soldiers starved to death. In Vilna alone, Russian troops captured 4 million servings of bread and rusks, 3.6 million servings of meat, and 9 million servings of brandy, wine, and beer, as well as several thousand tons of clothing and other military supplies. In Minsk, despite attempts to burn them while still occupying the city, they captured 2 million portions of bread and rusks. The Grande Armée's claim to be "faster and more mobile" than other armies meant that the militarily completely disorganized troops were unable to follow the combat units from the outset, so that starvation set in for many units even before they had crossed Nyemen or reached Grodno. Therefore, from the very beginning, many soldiers were in search of food and drink. It was not uncommon for them to leave their unit to search for food in distant villages (as numerous diaries and letters from soldiers attest). This was one of the reasons why the Grande Armée lost around 50,000 soldiers to desertion in the first six weeks.

The units had wagons for food, but no wagons for the feed of the 150,000 or so horses. The animals, which had to work hard every day and thus had an increased energy requirement, were largely dependent on the green fodder they could graze on during the night. As a result, about 10,000 horses were already broken down on the way to Vilna. By the time of the Battle of Smolensk, several tens of thousands of horses had already been lost. Despite the ongoing forced requisition of horses on the way, a large part of the French cavalry had to go on foot on the retreat from Moscow in order to be able to string wagons and guns. In spite of this, numerous ammunition wagons and cannons had to be burned or abandoned on the retreat after a short time due to the lack of draft animals. The same applied to the makeshift transport wagons for the sick and wounded.

The logistics of the "Grand Army" of 1812 were thus designed for a very short campaign at best. The "revolutionary" system based on requisitioning was already inadequate in Poland and Lithuania in view of the sparsely populated country, and it failed definitively when the army crossed the border into ("Old") Russia at the Dnieper (shortly before Smolensk) and from there on found almost nothing but deserted villages and large forests. Since the Grande Armée did not carry any tents for the soldiers, they had to bivouac in the open even in driving snow and freezing cold. The extensive abandonment of a militarily organized troop avenged itself in Russia. As a result, the invaders lost far more people to hunger, disease and desertion than to enemy action.

The advance

The invasion of the Grande Armée

On the night of June 24, 1812, Emperor Napoleon ordered the construction of three naval bridges at Kowno (Kaunas) and the crossing of his Grande Armée across the Nyemen. He thus at the same time crossed the frontier and opened the attack on Russia. Over the next few days until June 30, an army totaling about 475,000 men (including the Austrian Auxiliary Corps and the "Great Parks"; see above On the Strength of the French "Grande Armée") followed. The Emperor expected a quick victory; his strategic goal was to bring the main Russian forces to a battle and crush them as early as possible, so his troops followed the Russian forces in rapid marches. The pursuit had disastrous results:

Immediately after the invasion, thundershowers began for days, turning the country into swamp and mire. Attempting to cross the swollen Wilia, most of the soldiers of a Polish cavalry squadron drowned. The army became more and more distant from its supply transports, which became bogged down in the mud. The Saxon general Ferdinand von Funck reported that bread for four to five days was hauled on more than 1200 farmer's wagons. Nevertheless, the soldiers starved because the bread did not reach them. Every soldier carried an emergency ration of rusks, but it was strictly forbidden to attack them. The sparsely populated country could not feed the great mass of the army, besides, the Russian army had already supplied itself from the country. Impure water, drawn from rivers and swamps, caused many soldiers to fall ill with dysentery. The brandy, which was usually used to make the water drinkable, had run out. Ferdinand von Funck wrote of this: "Dysentery was literally raging among the regiments, and when we stopped on the way, it was always necessary to determine by the wind the side to which the people should turn to satisfy natural needs, because almost in a few minutes the air was polluted." Thousands of soldiers died of disease or debilitation in the first few weeks, many deserted, and some soldiers, in desperation, took their own lives. Deserters, recaptured, were usually shot. Others roamed the country in small or larger gangs, terrorizing the population. The losses of horses were enormous, already in the first days more than 20,000 died. The feed situation for the enormous amount of horses was dramatic. Straw was fed from the roofs of the houses, if they had not yet burned down. Hay and oats were rarely available, unripe grain led to disease and the constant advance did not provide sufficient rest for the horses.

Through letters from the soldiers, these conditions were very quickly known in Germany, which led to alarm. As early as August 2, King Frederick of Württemberg therefore forbade his soldiers who were in Russia to spread bad news at home: "Allerhöchstdieselben therefore wish to have any further written statements of this kind forbidden in the most serious manner, with the serious addition that if such should happen again, the authors will be punished with the most severe penalties.

Tsar Alexander I had already been in command of the Russian army since the end of April. Militarily, he had little experience and relied on his advisors, such as the Prussian General Karl Ludwig von Phull. The 1st Russian Western Army under Barclay de Tolly was vastly outnumbered by the French, consisting of about 118,000 men. It faced a superior force more than three times its size. More than 150 km to the south was the 2nd Western Army under Bagration with 35,000 men. The reserve army of Alexander Tormassov with 30-35,000 men was even further south and could not intervene in the fight against Napoleon's main army for the time being. To the east of it were the vast Pripyets Marshes, which made a retreat in that direction impossible. It was faced only by the Austrian auxiliary corps in the Brest-Litovsk area. Napoleon reinforced it with the 7th Corps, which consisted of Saxon troops. Chichagov's army, returning from the war against the Ottoman Empire, was still far away, as were reinforcements from Finland under General Steinheil. Barclay de Tolly and Bagration had to retreat. The first skirmish between Russian and French troops occurred at Deweltowo on June 28. During a heavy thunderstorm Napoleon entered Vilna in the afternoon of the same day. A week later, on July 5, the first artillery duel took place on the Düna, and three days later Marshal Davout occupied Minsk.

General von Phull's retreat was not fast enough, several times he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Clausewitz to Barclay de Tolly to persuade him to retreat more quickly. He feared that Napoleon would be at Drissa before the Russian army. There Russia had begun to build up positions months before, and the army was going to stand for battle, according to Phull's plan. Bagration was to take the offensive at the same time in the rear of Napoleon's army. When the army arrived at Drissa, the prepared terrain proved unsuitable. It was directly on the Düna River, which was not very deep at this point. Parts of the French army could have stabbed the Russian army in the back after bypassing it. Bridges were not available, so if they had retreated, the cannons would have had to be left behind. Defeat would have resulted in the annihilation of the army and thus the defeat of Russia. On July 10 the advance guard of the 4th French Cavalry Corps Latour-Maubourg, under Polish General Rosnietzky, was ambushed near Mir and beaten by Cossacks under General Platov. On July 14 the Russian army left Drissa. On the same day there was another engagement between Cossacks and Polish cavalry under Rosnietzky at Romanovo.

After the rains of the first few days, a heat wave had set in that caused both sides to suffer. Clausewitz reported that he had never suffered so much from thirst in his life. On the French side, the supply situation continued to be catastrophic, with dust and heat adding to the soldiers' woes. The army's losses increased; already in the first two weeks it had lost 135,000 men without any major fighting having taken place. Thousands of horse carcasses lay along the marching roads. Medical supplies did not work because ambulances were left behind. There was a shortage of vinegar, which was used for disinfecting, as well as medicines and bandages. As Larrey reported, shirts, and later paper, canvas or hay were used to bandage the wounded. There was no substitute for the medicines, nor for the vinegar.

Barclay de Tolly takes command

After the army arrived at Polotsk on 18 July, the Tsar handed over command to Barclay de Tolly and travelled to St Petersburg via Moscow. In a manifesto of the same day, the Tsar called on the Russian nobility to provide soldiers and stated that a commander-in-chief for the army would be appointed later. Barclay de Tolly left 25,000 men under General Wittgenstein at Polozk to secure the road to St Petersburg, the 2nd and 6th Corps of Napoleon's army marched towards Polozk. Barclay de Tolly moved his army on to Vitebsk, where he planned to unite with the 2nd Western Army. Napoleon tried to prevent the union of the two armies. On July 23, General Nikolaï Raïevski, ordered by Bagration with his corps to Mogilev, was able to hold off Marshal Davout's troops in battle for only one day and had to retreat. As a result, a march north to Vitebsk was no longer possible. Bagration had to move in the direction of Smolensk. Barclay de Tolly meanwhile had reached Vitebsk and sent General Ostermann's corps to Ostrovno to secure it. After three days' fighting Ostermann was defeated on 27 July. On the same day there was a Russian success, more than 2,100 Saxons under General Klengel surrendered to units of Tormasov's army after the Battle of Kobrin.

In order to still unite the two armies, Barclay de Tolly also had to move towards Smolensk and left Vitebsk. Napoleon reached Vitebsk on July 28 and stopped the advance of his army. He announced that he intended to spend the winter here and that the war would continue the following year. Because of the disastrous supply situation, this was difficult to do. The Russian supply depots had been destroyed, and his own supply depots in Prussia and Poland were far away. From the newly established depot in Wilna to Vitebsk the distance was more than 300 kilometres. Napoleon had overstretched his supply line. With the poor road conditions, sufficient supplies could not be guaranteed during the winter and the subsequent melting of the snow. He was left with two alternatives: withdraw the entire army to a realistic supply line or march on to more fertile areas between Smolensk and Moscow.

Davout and Bagration, meanwhile, moved on parallel routes in the direction of Smolensk. Wittgenstein defeated French troops near Kljastizy on July 31. In the ensuing pursuit the Russian General Kulnew was mortally wounded the following day. Barclay de Tolly reached Smolensk on August 2, Bagration two days later. A few days after this the fighting for Polozk began between von Wittgenstein's corps and the two French corps.

With regard to Bagration, the Tsar had not established clear conditions. Bagration was the senior general and was not specifically subordinated to Barclay de Tolly. Since the latter was also Minister of War, he took command. Bagration disagreed with Barclay de Tolly's conduct of the war, and he was particularly supported in this by General Jermolow, chief of Barclay de Tolly's general staff. In several letters to Jermolov and General Araktscheev, Bagration had been complaining for weeks about Barclay de Tolly's retreat tactics. To many Russians, as a Livonian, he was a German. In fact, he preferred to speak German and only poorly Russian, so he liked to surround himself with German officers. When he appointed Clausewitz to the General Staff without consulting Yermolov, arguments broke out between Yermolov and Colonel Wolzogen, who had mediated it. Before this Barclay de Tolly had already, under similar circumstances, hired Leopold von Lützow. Eugene of Württemberg and the Russian Colonel Toll also supported Bagration and wanted the latter to assume the supreme command. General Bennigsen had ambitions for the supreme command himself, and also advocated the replacement of Barclay de Tolly. This intrigue, and the fear of the Russian nobility for their estates, led to the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief.

On August 7, the two Russian armies advanced from Smolensk towards Rudnia. The following day, near Inkovo, there was a skirmish between cavalry units of General Sebastiani and Cossacks under Platov, Sebastiani retreated. Sebastiani's documents fell into the hands of the Russian army. Wolzogen, evaluating them, found a letter in which Marshal Murat had warned Sebastiani against attacking. According to Wolzogen, the text read in substance:

"I have just learned that the Russians intend to make a forcible reconnaissance in the direction of Rudnia; be on your guard, and retire to the infantry which you are directed to support ..."

Barclay de Tolly also confirmed that the Russian plan had been betrayed. Among others, Woldemar von Löwenstern, on Barclay de Tolly's staff, came under suspicion. He wrote in his "Memories of a Livonian" that he was sent as a courier to Moscow and unsuspectingly delivered a letter ordering him to be arrested. Three other officers of Polish origin, as well as Prince Lubomirsky, had suffered the same fate. Lieutenant-Colonel Count de Lezair, a Frenchman by birth, and Bagration's aide-de-camp, arrived in Moscow shortly afterwards, and unsuspectingly delivered his own warrant. Löwenstern was released soon after, Lezair not until 1815. As Wolzogen later wrote, Lubomirsky, an aide-de-camp to the Tsar, was the culprit. He had overheard the conversation of some generals in Smolensk, and in a letter warned his mother, who was at her castle in Lyadui, in the designated battle area. In this castle Murat had his headquarters, which, of course, Lubomirsky did not know. After the defeat of Inkovo, Napoleon set his troops in motion again and left Vitebsk. His army gathered in the Smolensk area, Barclay de Tolly and Bagration had to retreat. The Russian rearguard under General Newerowski was engaged in a skirmish with the 3rd Corps of the French Army at Krasnoi on 15 August, suffering considerable casualties and losing nine cannon. It was Napoleon's 43rd birthday, and in the evening he was presented with the captured cannons.

The fortifications of Smolensk were in poor condition and could not be held in the long run. Barclay de Tolly therefore wanted to defend the city with only a part of his troops, while Bagration's army was to retreat eastwards to Dorogobusch. The rest of the 1st Western Army was to provide flank security. The defense of the town was only to secure the retreat of the two armies. On August 17, the Battle of Smolensk was fought. Napoleon's main army had only 175,000 men left before the battle. In all, he had already lost more than a third of his army, mainly to disease, enfeeblement, and desertion. The Russian army had also suffered losses through desertion on the way to Smolensk, mostly soldiers from the Polish territories occupied by Russia. In addition, there were losses due to diseases, from which the Russian army was not spared. After two days of fighting the Russian army withdrew from Smolensk, Wittgenstein also had to retreat to Polozk. The commander of the Bavarians, General Deroy, was mortally wounded in the fighting for Polozk, as was General Justus Siebein. Marshal Oudinot was wounded, as were the Bavarian generals Karl von Vincenti and Clemens von Raglovich.

On the retreat, Barclay de Tolly succeeded in driving back French troops at Walutino on 19 August. General Junot's corps did not intervene in the fighting, thus preventing a possible French victory. French General Gudin was mortally wounded and Russian General Tuchkov was taken prisoner, seriously wounded.

Kutuzov becomes commander-in-chief

After the Battle of Smolensk, the 67-year-old Kutuzov replaced Barclay de Tolly, who was later accused of destroying Smolensk. In fact, the city had caught fire from artillery fire, and soldiers from both sides had set fires during the fighting to secure their retreat or prevent the enemy's advance. Barclay de Tolly had given orders for the burning of the warehouses. As the town consisted largely of wooden houses, these fires had devastating consequences. On August 20, the Tsar appointed Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. The decision to appoint Kutuzov had been made three days earlier, a panel of six generals convened by the Tsar had made the proposal. The Tsar had delayed Kutuzov's appointment because he disliked him. As a native Russian and an experienced general, Kutuzov had the support of the Russian people and nobility.

Barclay de Tolly had reached Tsaryovo-Saimishche with his troops on August 29 and had begun to develop positions there for a battle. The same day Kutuzov joined the army and ordered to accelerate the expansion of positions. In the afternoon of the next day he gave the order to retreat. On August 31, the army reached Gshatsk (now Gagarin) and again began to expand entrenchments. This time General Bennigsen, by now Kutuzov's Chief of General Staff, did not like the position, and again Kutuzov ordered a retreat. In Barclay de Tolly's view, the only reason the two positions were not chosen for battle was because he had chosen them. This would have diminished Kutuzov's success in the event of a victory. As to the subsequent course, he wrote to the Czar: "The two armies moved like the children of Israel in the Arabian Desert, without rule nor order from place to place, until at last fate led them to the position of Borodino."

In the meantime the Russian Orthodox Church had called for resistance against the "Antichrist" Napoleon. He would desecrate the churches, kidnap women and children, and even the serfs would lead a worse life under Napoleon than under the Russian nobility, the priests declared. The Russian people were strictly devout, and the appeal did not fail to have its effect; the resistance of the civil population increased. Even before that, some peasants had fought against plunder, but then it was a question of their own property and the protection of their families; now it was also a question of faith and the fatherland. Accordingly, Kutuzov formulated his order of the day before the battle of Borodino: "Trusting in God, we will either win or die. Napoleon is his enemy. He will desecrate his churches. Think of your wives and children who count on your protection. Think of your Emperor, who is with you. Before the sun has set tomorrow, you will have written on this field, with the blood of the enemy, the testimony of your faith and your love of country."

On September 7, the Battle of Borodino took place. The losses of the Grande Armée were less than 30,000 men. The Russian army lost more than 50,000 soldiers. The battle was led on the Russian side by Bagration and Barclay de Tolly, who both entered the fighting at the head of their forces. Bagration received a shot in the lower leg and died 17 days later. Kutuzov had his headquarters at Gorky, from where he could hardly follow the battle. When he learned of the defeat, he threw a tantrum and refused to believe it. Afterwards he proclaimed a Russian victory, and even today it is widely claimed that it was at least a draw. The facts are against it. Kutuzov was forced to retreat and reached Moscow with only about 70,000 operational soldiers out of 128,000 before. Napoleon reached Moscow with about 100,000 soldiers out of less than 130,000 before. Compared to the original strength, he had already lost more than two thirds of his main army at this point, in addition to the high loss of horses, which was to have dramatic effects later. At the Battle of Borodino, much of Napoleon's remaining cavalry was destroyed. Due to a lack of horses, cavalry units were formed on foot.

In the battle, Württemberger, Saxony, Bavaria and Westphalia suffered heavy losses. The Westphalian losses alone amounted to about 3,000 men, the Westphalian generals Tharreau, Damas and von Lepel were killed, the generals Hammerstein and von Borstel were wounded. Wounded were the Württemberg generals von Breuning, von Scheeler, and the Bavarian general Dommanget.

The occupation of Moscow

Since Kutuzov had declared victory at Borodino, Moscow initially saw no reason to abandon the city. The decision to vacate the city was not taken until the afternoon of September 13. When Marshal Murat wanted to enter Moscow on September 14, the city had not yet been completely cleared, many citizens of Moscow and soldiers of the Russian army were still in the city. After negotiations, Murat agreed to wait a few hours. In the afternoon he marched into Moscow. The Russian army had to leave behind nearly 10,000 wounded or sick soldiers. Several 1000 Russian stragglers were captured, some of whom had preferred to take part in the looting of Moscow, losing touch with the army. Moscow merchants had urged them to plunder because they did not want their goods to fall into French hands. Heinrich von Brandt, an officer in the Vistula Legion, reported that whole wagon trains of flour, groats, meat and brandy were found when they marched in. On the same day the victory of Borodino was announced in St. Petersburg. For days the victory was celebrated, Kutuzov was appointed marshal and prince.

On the evening of September 14, the first fires occurred in Moscow, possibly caused by drunken French soldiers carelessly handling fire. These fires were largely under control by the next morning. The following night new fires broke out in many places in Moscow. A storm on September 16 caused the fire to spread rapidly. 75% of the city, two-thirds of which consisted of wooden houses, was destroyed. Many people died in the flames, including wounded or sick Russian soldiers. Looting by the French army had been officially forbidden, but in the face of the fire everything of value that could be moved was taken from the houses. In a letter to the Tsar on September 20, Napoleon blamed the Governor of Moscow, Count Rostopchin, for the fires. According to his account, 400 arsonists had been caught in the act. They had named Rostopchin as their patron and were shot. The city's fire engines had been removed from the city or destroyed on Rostopchin's orders. After the fire, 11,959 dead were counted, as well as 12,456 horse carcasses. Of 9,158 houses, 6,532 were destroyed, and of the 290 churches, 127 were affected.

John Quincy Adams wrote that the first rumors that Moscow was occupied circulated in Saint Petersburg on September 21. But he also mentioned that there were other rumors: the French army had been defeated and Napoleon mortally wounded. There was silence from the official side. It was not until September 27 that it was announced that Moscow would have to be evacuated. According to Adams, presented as an event of insignificance, it was irrelevant to the outcome of the war.

No real decisive importance is to be attached to the fire of Moscow, since nevertheless still significant quantities of material could be found for the supply at least of the infantry. The state of the French army increased subsequently during the stay by the arrival of stragglers. Nevertheless, enormous indiscipline in the form of uncontrolled looting and requisitions had a negative effect on the supply situation. Found stocks of liquor led to devastating excesses by the French soldiers. Napoleon himself resided in the Kremlin, which had remained intact. Most of the army was housed, less comfortably, outside the city. Napoleon waited in vain for the Tsar to offer him negotiations. Several times he sent negotiators to Kutuzov to offer negotiations. The Tsar was unwilling to negotiate and on October 4 forbade Kutuzov to hold further talks. Alexander I was angry; he had already informed Kutuzov in August, before the latter's departure for the army, that all talks and negotiations with the enemy that might lead to peace were to be avoided. His letter was a clear rebuke to Kutuzov: "Now, after what has happened, I must repeat with the same firmness that I wish to see this principle which I have adopted observed by you to its greatest extent and in the strictest and most unbending manner." Except for a few outpost skirmishes, a sort of tacit truce prevailed until this interdict, as Napoleon at first waited for offers of negotiation, and when these failed to materialize, offered negotiations himself. The Russian army was able to take advantage of this and brought in reinforcements. Twice Napoleon had sent General Lauriston to Kutuzov as a negotiator. When Lauriston returned on October 13 without results, Napoleon decided to withdraw.

In the meantime, Great Britain had participated in the war with considerable funds and arms supplies to Russia. Initially, the only soldier to take part in the campaign was the British General Sir Robert Wilson. He was later followed by Captain Dawson Damer as his adjutant. There were certainly demands for peace in St Petersburg, even from the Tsar's mother and his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine. Baron vom Stein, an advisor to the Tsar, wrote that many around the Tsar wanted peace, including General Araktscheev. On the other hand, there were many nobles who would not have supported a peace agreement.

Moscow 1812, drawing by Major General Christian Wilhelm von Faber du Faur from: Leaves from my portfolio drawn on the spot in the course of the 1812 campaign in Russia.


A. Smirnov: Moscow fire


Marching routes for invasion and retreat, map from 1872


Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly, portrait by George Dawe, 1829


Map of Moscow around 1812, representation from 1872