War in Afghanistan (2001–present)

War in Kabul and other areas of Afghanistan

After the withdrawal of the Soviet army, an intra-Afghan war ensued with the participation of various regional powers. This was marked by the withdrawal of the two superpowers and the disinterest of large parts of the international community in the situation in Afghanistan. The vacant position was taken by the regional powers, notably Pakistan, but also Iran, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan. Pakistan's collaboration with the militia leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyār was one of the main reasons for the military escalation in the capital Kabul in 1992.

After the end of the Soviet-backed government, the Peshawar Accords, agreed upon by the mujahideen parties, had established the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government. Subsequently, however, Gulbuddin Hekmatyār's Hizb-i Islāmī militia turned against the newly formed state and launched a bombing campaign against the capital Kabul with Pakistani support. This was despite the fact that Hekmatyār had been repeatedly offered the post of prime minister. Hekmatyār was armed, financed and guided by Pakistan. Afghanistan expert and university professor Amin Saikal concluded in his 2006 book Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival:

During the most intense phase of the bombardment by Hekmatyār and the Junbisch-i Milli militia led by Rashid Dostum, over 25,000 people died in Kabul.

Kabul became a symbol of the country's fragmentation, while tensions escalated between further militias supported and in certain respects controlled by Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other. Kabul was divided into different zones of influence, where most of the fighting was concentrated. Kandahar in the south of the country and Mazār-i Sharif in the north also experienced bloody fighting. In contrast, the rural regions devastated in the Soviet-Afghan War were hardly affected by fighting, and reconstruction began. Power structures in Afghanistan were highly decentralized. Southern Afghanistan was neither under the control of the central government nor under the control of externally controlled militias such as the Hekmatyārs. It was dominated by local militia or tribal leaders.

In 1994, the Taliban first appeared in Kandahar. The Taliban movement originally stemmed from religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, mostly run by the Pakistani political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. During 1994, the Taliban took power in several southern and western provinces of Afghanistan.

In late 1994, Afghan Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud (1953-2001) succeeded in militarily defeating the militias fighting for supremacy in Kabul. Kabul experienced a brief period of relative calm. Massoud initiated a political process aimed at national consolidation and democratic elections, in which representatives from much of Afghanistan's provinces participated. Massoud invited the Taliban to join this process and participate in creating stability. The Taliban rejected a democratic form of government.

In early 1995, the Taliban launched large-scale offensives to bomb Kabul. Amnesty International writes about this:

The Taliban initially suffered heavy defeats against Massoud's troops, so that some observers already suspected the end of the Taliban. By mid-1996, however, they had reorganized with the support of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and were planning a renewed major offensive against Kabul. On September 26, 1996, Massoud ordered a strategic withdrawal of his forces into northern Afghanistan. On September 27, 1996, the Taliban invaded Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. A military and political opposition led by Massoud, the United Islamic Front, kept the northeast of the country under its control. The United Front continued to provide the government formally recognized by most states and the United Nations.

Taliban/Pakistan/Al-Qaida vs. United Front

With the advance of the Taliban from 1994 onwards, fighting again spread to areas outside Kabul. The Taliban imposed their political and legal interpretation of Islam on the areas under their control. Women lived under virtual house arrest. According to a United Nations report, the Taliban committed systematic massacres against civilians as they sought to consolidate their control in western and northern Afghanistan. The United Nations named 15 massacres from 1996 to 2001, saying they were "highly systematic and all traceable to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or Mullah Omar (1960-2013) personally." The so-called 055 Brigade of al-Qaida was also involved in atrocities against Afghan civilians. The United Nations report cites testimony describing Arab militiamen carrying long knives with which they slit throats and skinned people.

Soon the United Front developed into a national political resistance movement against the Taliban, which was joined by representatives of all Afghan population groups (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks and Turkmen). The human rights situation depended on the particular commanders who controlled certain areas. Human Rights Watch (HRW) recorded no human rights crimes for troops under the direct control of Ahmad Shah Massoud for the period from October 1996 until Massoud's assassination in September 2001. According to HRW, most human rights violations committed by members of the United Front dated from 1996 to 1998, while Rashid Dostum controlled large parts of the north. In 1997, Dostum's forces, under the command of Abdul Malik Pahlawan, executed 3,000 Taliban prisoners in and around Mazar-e Sharif.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf - then Chief of Staff of the military, among other positions - sent tens of thousands of Pakistanis to fight alongside the Taliban and al-Qaeda against the United Front. Estimates suggest that a total of 28,000 Pakistani nationals fought inside Afghanistan. 20,000 of these were regular Pakistani soldiers in the so-called Frontier Corps or Army. Another estimated 8,000 were militiamen recruited in madrasas to fight in the Taliban's army. Among the estimated 25,000 members of the Taliban forces, 8000 were Pakistani nationals. A 1998 U.S. State Department document wrote that 20 percent to 40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers were Pakistani. According to the document, the parents of Pakistani nationals "did not know of their children's military involvement with the Taliban until their bodies were brought back to Pakistan."

Another 3000 soldiers of the regular Taliban army were militiamen from Arab countries or Central Asia. From 1996 to 2001, Osama bin Laden and Aiman az-Zawahiri's al-Qaeda became a state within the Taliban state. Among other things, al-Qaeda established a series of training camps where thousands of Islamists from various countries underwent military training. Bin Laden sent his recruits against the United Front.

Of an estimated 45,000 soldiers who fought against the United Front inside Afghanistan, only about 14,000 were Afghans.

Ahmad Shah Massoud was the only United Front leader in Afghanistan from 1998 onwards who was able to successfully defend his territories. In early 2001, the United Front applied a new strategy of local military pressure and a global political agenda. Resentment and opposition to the Taliban, starting from the roots of Afghan society, became increasingly strong. This also affected the Pashtun areas. In total, an estimated one million people fled the Taliban. Hundreds of thousands of civilians fled to Ahmad Shah Massoud's areas. The National Geographic concludes in its documentary Inside the Taliban:

In the areas under his control, Massoud established democratic institutions and he signed the Declaration for Women's Rights. He trained more police forces to prevent a repeat of the chaos of Kabul (1992-1994) if the United Front were to succeed. In the spring of 2001, Massoud addressed the European Parliament in Brussels and asked the international community for humanitarian aid for the people of Afghanistan. He stated that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had introduced a "very wrong interpretation of Islam" and that if the Taliban did not have the support of Pakistan, they would not be able to sustain their military campaigns within a year. On his visit to Europe, Massoud warned that, according to information from his intelligence service, a large-scale attack on American soil was imminent.

On September 9, 2001, two Arab suicide bombers posing as journalists detonated a bomb they had hidden in their video camera during an interview with Massoud in Takhar, Afghanistan. Massoud died of his injuries a short time later. Although the funeral was held in the very rural Punjir Valley, hundreds of thousands of grieving Afghans attended. Many feared the final victory of the Taliban after Massoud's assassination. John P. O'Neill, an FBI counterterrorism expert, had taken the position of head of security for the Twin Towers two weeks before the attacks on the World Trade Center. On Sept. 10, O'Neill told two friends:

O'Neill was killed in the collapse of the South Tower on September 11, 2001.

On 11 September 2001, 19 members of al-Qaida carried out the terrorist attacks in the United States. The United States government then demanded that the Taliban leadership close al-Qaida's training camps and extradite its leaders. The UN Security Council also called for Osama bin Laden's extradition - "immediately and unconditionally" - citing UN Resolution 1333. The Taliban conceded that bin Laden could be responsible for the attacks, but demanded proof, international recognition of the Taliban regime, and the lifting of UN sanctions against Afghanistan in order to extradite him.

Security Council Resolutions

The United Nations Security Council, in its Resolution 1368 adopted on 12 September 2001, described the attacks in the United States as a "threat to international peace and security". It also stressed the "natural right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by the Charter of the United Nations". In this context, the attacks of 11 September 2001 were classified as an armed attack under Articles 39 and 51 of the UN Charter. Thus, the United States was implicitly granted the right of self-defense. In the view of the United States and other governments, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, this formulation and the direct reference to the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter meant that the Security Council regarded the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom as an "act of self-defence by the United States" against the attack planned from Afghanistan and thus legitimised it under international law.

At the request of the participants in the first Afghanistan Conference in 2001, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of the ISAF Protection Force, a security and reconstruction mission led by NATO, on 20 December 2001 (Resolution 1386). The mission is not a peacekeeping blue-helmet mission, but a so-called peace-enforcing mission under the responsibility of the participating states.

Decision of the North Atlantic Council

On 12 September 2001, the NATO Council had declared the events of 11 September 2001 to be an attack on one of the NATO countries if it could be confirmed that they had been directed from outside the United States. On October 2, Francis X. Taylor, United States Coordinator for Counterterrorism, informed the NATO Council that the bombers belonged to al-Qaida, which would be protected by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Thus, for the first time in NATO's history, the case for alliance under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty had arisen, according to which "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" and assistance would be provided in response "in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations".

As long as the attacks of 11 September 2001 could be directly or indirectly attributed to Afghanistan, which was ruled by the Taliban at the time, the involvement of NATO countries was considered less problematic on the basis of the Alliance case than it has been since the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001. The indefinite nature of the alliance case is also disputed.

National mandate of the troop-contributing countries

Within the framework of the UN mandate, the countries wishing to provide troops for the mission decide nationally on the mandate for their own troops and how this is to be structured (Rules of Engagement). For the German military mission in Afghanistan, the German government requires a parliamentary resolution by the Bundestag for the deployment of armed forces. This must be renewed regularly. The legitimacy of the participation of German troops in the ISAF mission is not undisputed from the perspective of constitutional and international law.

Combatant status for the Taliban

President Bush's decision of 7 February 2002 to deny the Taliban combatant status and thus to restrict the application of the international law of war is now widely regarded as legally unjustified (see Unlawful combatants).